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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Petitioners' Petition 
for Review of non-final administrative orders, when Petitioners, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991) and Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65B, made a showing that absent review of the 
orders, Petitioners would be irreparably harmed and had no other 
means of redress? 
ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
A copy of the unpublished Order in the above-encaptioned case, 
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 29, 1992, is attached as an 
exhibit to this Petition. 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The Order of the Utah Court of Appeals from which Petitioners 
seek review is dated May 29, 1992. There has been no request for 
rehearing or extension for time to petition for certiorari. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1991) confers jurisdiction upon 
the Supreme Court to review this Order: 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Constitution Art. X, Sec. 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1991) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, inclu-
ding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board 
of State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the 
state engineer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991) 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting 
all administrative remedies available, except that: 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all ad-
ministrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are 
inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result 
in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for 
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph 
(b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving 
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other types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph 
(d) (involving wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or 
paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority)• There shall be no special 
form of writ. The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings 
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this 
rule does not provide special proceedures, proceedings on petitions 
for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set 
forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply 
with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose 
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this 
paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or 
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction 
or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administra-
tive agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act 
required by law as a duty of office, trust, or station; or (C) 
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or 
person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right 
or office to which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a 
petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse 
parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing 
order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the 
merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent 
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accor-
dance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings 
are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further 
than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its 
authority. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The five interlocutory orders from which Petitioners brought 
then "Jet il in tin IN IUI ni#i i(iin i i entered - • the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing, administrative Law Judge 
(A.L.J Steven Ecklund presiding, on Apri 1992 and April 
17, 1992 ^ Review Or, In 
The Alternative, For Extraordinary Relief :i n the Utah Court of 
Appeal 1992. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' 
Petition an Order dated May 29, 1 992 Order 
that Petitioners bring this Petition for Certiorari. 
Statement of the Facts 
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational ainJ Profes-
sional Licensing of the Utah Department of Commerce (Division) 
filed nil Hot ice i i Ai|<ini,.iy Act ion against Petitioners, seeking to 
suspend or revoke Petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional 
conduct under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 58-7-2(6) (1989). 
Among other things, the Di vi si on a] 1 eged t:1 * ", ,|-"1 :tioners had 
violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. SS 58-7 i(7) (k) , -(1) , 
•-(q), and -tr\ by, among other things, taking lewd nude photo-
graphs of a patient,„ i,i id perform i I'ng unnecessary treatments 
in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors. 
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the 
action. On May * . * , the Division heard or a] arguments oi lln s, 
motion and entered a preliminary order as to the identity of the 
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presiding officer. On April 1, 1992, in oral argument, Petitio-
ners requested a clarification of this order. On April 7, 1992, 
A.L.J. Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order, 
which stated that the Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would 
act as the presiding officer to determine factual issues and render 
a written recommended order, and that the A.L.J, would act as the 
presiding officer for legal issues and would assist the Board in 
preparing that order. 
On June 20, 1991, Petitioners filed a motion to close the 
hearing on the matter to all members of the press and public. On 
July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memorandum. The Salt 
Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion. 
On July 2, 1991, the Division granted the Tribune's motion to 
intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed its memorandum 
in opposition to Petitioners' motion. On July 9 and 10, 1991, 
Petitioners filed replies to the submissions of the Division and 
the Tribune. Oral argument on this motion was heard on April 1, 
1992 by A.L.J. Ecklund. On April 7, 1991, he ordered that Peti-
tioners' motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board, 
and that the hearing was governed by the Open and Public Meetings 
Act because the Board, rather than the A.L.J., was the presiding 
officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied 
Petitioners' motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing 
be open to the press and public. 
5 
On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to 
exclude certain evidence, including: (1) K.W.'s prior sexual 
history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that nature as 
to similarly situated witnesses. Petitioners filed a response to 
this motion on July 1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed 
a reply memorandum. A.L.J. Ecklund heard oral argument on this 
motion on April 1, 1992. He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and 
other witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation be 
excluded from the proceedings on April 17, 1992. 
On July 11, 1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of 
the standard of proof which should govern a hearing on the merits 
of the action. Petitioners filed a response on June 21, 1991, to 
which the Division replied on July 1, 1991. A.L.J. Ecklund also 
heard this motion on April 1, 1992. Following oral argument, on 
April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard of proof for profes-
sional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the 
evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence. 
Petitioners attempted to appeal all of these interlocutory 
orders to the Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2) (1991) AND UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991). 
This Petition sets forth an issue of first impression in the 
State of Utah: Is there any statutory provision for interlocutory 
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appellate review of orders of state administrative agencies and, 
if there is such provision, did the Court of Appeals err in denying 
Respondents7 Petition for Review? 
Two Utah statutes define the jurisidiction of the Court of 
Appeals over orders of administrative agencies, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2) (1991) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1991). 
Section 78-2a-3(2), in relevant part, states: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies • • » 
(Emphasis added.) 
hjL The Legislature Has Granted Appellate Jurisdiction Over 
Interlocutory Appeals From State Agencies To The Utah Court 
Of Appeals. 
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is that words 
used in statutes should be given their ordinary, plain meaning, 
In re R.D.S. . 777 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah 1989), because the plain, ordinary 
meaning is the best indication of legislative intent. Berube v. 
Fashion Centre. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). As a corol-
lary, unambiguous language in a statute may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 500 
(Utah 1989); accord gamp y, Qffjgs pf Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 
242, 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, a statute should be read 
according to its literal wording "unless it would be unreasonably 
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confusing or inoperable." Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). 
Further, in interpreting legislation, this Court must assume 
that "the legislature advisedly adopted each term of a statute," 
and must, accordingly, "construe statutory provisions to make them 
harmonious with the other statutes relevant to the subject matter." 
State v. Chindgren, 777 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord 
Amax Magnesium Corp., 796 P.2d at 1258; State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 
1228, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This is because "the intent of 
the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context 
and structure in which it is placed." Taylor v. Utah State 
Training School. 775 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accor-
dingly, this Court must favor a construction "which gives effect 
to all of [the statute's] provisions," Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
784 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1989); aSSSEfl flcByide yy Carter, 784 P.2d 
141, 143 (Utah 1989), so must give "effect to each . . . word, 
phrase, clause, and sentence where reasonably possible." Chris & 
Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n of the State of Utah. 791 
P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990), Howe. J., dissenting. This Court "may 
not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or delete, 
subtract, or omit anything therefrom." Iji. Statutory language may 
only be omitted, eliminated, or disregarded as surplusage "when the 
words of a statute are • • . meaningless or inconsistent with the 
intention of the legislature otherwise plainly expressed in the 
statute." Ifl. Thus, "[a] court will not construe a particular 
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provision of a statute so as to neutralize or modify other provi-
sions if any other construction of the particular provision is at 
all tenable." I£. Section 78-2a-3(2), accordingly, must be 
interpreted by this Court according to its plain, ordinary meaning 
and, to the extent reasonably possible, the interpretation must 
include the meaning of all words, phrases, clauses, and sentences 
in the statute. 
The emphasized language in section 78-2a-3(2) unambiguously 
indicates that the Court of Appeals has "interlocutory appellate 
jurisdiction" over "final orders" and "decrees" of state agencies. 
Because "orders" and "decrees" issuing from state agencies are 
essentially the same thing, the term "decrees" should be distin-
guished from the term "final orders," to utilize each term of the 
statute. Because the statute has already provided that the Court 
of Appeals has interlocutory jurisdiction, a reasonable interpreta-
tion is that "final orders" applies to final agency action and 
"decrees" applies to non-final agency action, thereby giving the 
Court jurisdiction over both final and non-final administrative 
actions. 
In contrast, interpreting "final orders and decrees" to mean 
"final orders and final decrees" would make the legislature's use 
of the term "decrees" redundant and without meaning, in violation 
of the canons of statutory interpretation. If the legislature had 
intended to limit the Court's jurisdiction to final orders only, 
it presumably would have used the language it has used elsewhere 
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for this purpose, "final agency action." See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(l) (1991). To adopt the position that the Court of 
Appeals only has jurisdiction over final agency orders, this Court 
would have to disregard the phrase "including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals" in the initial statement, which is ap-
plicable by its position to the entire subsection, including sub-
subsection (a)• This statute, accordingly, should be interpreted 
to give the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over both final orders 
and interlocutory decrees coming from state agencies. 
B. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act Allows Judicial Review 
Of Non-Final Agency Actions In Compelling Circumstances. 
The Court of Appeals is required, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(4) (1991) to "comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings." 
One of these requirements, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1991), 
states that "the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has juris-
diction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings." This statute sets forth the general 
rule that a party may seek judicial review of an agency action only 
after exhausting all available administrative remedies. See Tax 
Comm'n v. Tver son, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). The steps 
required for exhaustion of available administrative remedies are 
specified by statute and generally include: (1) The initial final 
determination of the issue by the agency; (2) an additional 
application for review or rehearing; Hi-Country Homeowners Assn. 
v. Public Service Comm'n. 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989); and (3) 
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in some cases, additional administrative appeals. See, e.g.. 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce. Div. of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. 810 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(there is no statutory requirement for agency review of an order 
of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing com-
parable to what Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 provides for the Public 
Service Commission)• In the present case, we are concerned only 
with the first administrative remedy, the final determination of 
the issue by the agency. 
There are exceptions to this general rule. The statutory 
justification for these exceptions is set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-14(2) (1991), which provides as follows: 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except 
that: 
. . . 
(b) the court may relieve a party seek-
ing judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative reme-
dies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies 
would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public bene-
fit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
Through the plain language of subsection (b), a party may 
seek judicial review prior to exhaustion of any or all administra-
tive remedies if the administrative remedies are inadequate or the 
exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dispropor-
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tionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
Because a party may be relieved of the requirement of exhaustion 
with respect to "any or all adminstrative remedies,** and because 
a final determination is an administrative remedy, a party may, 
under this language, seek judicial review of an interlocutory 
administrative order if it comes within either sub-subsection (i) 
or sub-subsection (ii). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that such exceptions to 
the general rule exist. For example, in Iverson. 782 P.2d at 524, 
the Court stated: "Exceptions to this rule exist in unusual cir-
cumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some 
oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be uncon-
scionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears 
that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. ** See also State v. 
DuPere, 709 P.2d 493, 497 (Alaska 1985) (**in a proper case a court 
may exercise its discretion and provide judicial relief without 
requiring the claimant to exhaust his administrative remedies**). 
The Court of Appeals has, therefore, been explicitly granted 
interlocutory jurisdiction over appeals, including those from 
administrative actions. Further, the Utah Administrative Proce-
dure Act (UAPA), by which the appellate courts are bound, authori-
zes interlocutory administrative appeals within the restrictions 
set forth by S 63-46b-14(2). Accordingly, if petitioners can show 
that their appeal comes within these requirements, this Court 
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should determine that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to 
hear Petitioners' appeal. 
A±. There Is No Adequate Administrative Remedy For The Wrong 
Petitioners Assert. 
To come within the requirements of subsection (i), Petitio-
ners must show that "the administrative remedies are inadequate.11 
Although the Utah appellate courts, to Petitioners' knowledge, 
have not ruled on what constitutes an inadequate remedy, other 
jurisdictions have. As an example, the Arizona Supreme Court 
accepted jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory order of 
the Industrial Commission to the effect that the petitioner was 
not entitled to use a tape recorder during a medical examination. 
The court held that, because this was a discovery order and a tape 
recording of what was said during the examination would constitute 
admissible evidence at any Industrial Commission hearing, the 
petitioner did not have an adequate remedy after an award had been 
issued, and so came within this exception. Burton v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Arizona, 166 Ariz. 238, 801 P.2d 473, 474-75 (1990); see 
also Cussimanio v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 5 Kan. App. 2d 
379, 617 P.2d 107, 113 (1980) (••[e]xhaustion of administrative 
remedies is a matter within the sound discretion of the courts and 
is not required when administrative remedies are inadequate"); 
accord Tiernan v. Trustees of California State University and 
Colleges, 188 Cal. Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317, 320, 33 Cal. 3d 211 
(1983); Western Kansas Express, Inc. v. Duaan Truck Line, Inc. 11 
Kan. App. 2d 336, 720 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1986); Mattoon v. Citv of 
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Normanf 617 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Okla. 1980). "As a general rule, the 
exhaustion requirement is only applicable when there is an avail-
able procedure which, if pursued successfully would accomplish the 
petitioner's desired result." Lyke v. Lane County, 70 Or. App. 
82, 688 P.2d 411, 413 (1984). 
In the present case, there is no statutorily delineated 
method of obtaining redress from an interlocutory order within the 
Division, or any provision for agency review of even a final 
order. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 463. As such, there is no ad-
ministrative procedure which would right the wrong which Petitio-
ners assert. Further, because many of the issues raised by the 
appeal would be moot if a final order were obtained, especially 
the issues involving the open hearing procedure and the eviden-
tiary issues, pursuing the actions until a final order is obtained 
would not provide an adequate remedy. 
Many jurisdictions find that the requirement of exhausting 
administrative remedies is inapplicable when all that is involved 
in the appeal is statutory interpretation. For example, the court 
in Carter v. Alaska Public Employees Ass'n. 663 P.2d 916, 922 n. 
19 (Alaska 1983) stated that the doctrine of exhaustion of reme-
dies Mis not applicable where the remedy sought is judicial rather 
than administrative," and that M[resolution of a question of 
statutory interpretation is judicial rather than administrative." 
The issues raised in Petitioners' Petition are all matters of 
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statutory interpretation, making judicial review even more desi-
rable. 
2. If Forced To Exhaust Administrative Remedies, 
Petitioners Will suffer Irreparable Harm, 
To come within the requirements of subsection (ii), Petitio-
ners must show that "exhaustion of remedies would result in ir-
reparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from 
requiring exhaustion.11 Continuing the present adjudication 
through to a final order would result in irreparable harm to 
Petitioners which would be totally out of proportion to the good 
anticipated from requiring petitioners to exhaust administrative 
remedies• 
The major harm which will impact Petitioners should this 
Petition be denied, thereby forcing Petitioners to continue liti-
gation under the present orders, is the complete, total, and ir-
reparable damage to their personal and professional reputations 
which will result from an open and public hearing on the merits of 
the case. Because of the extremely controversial and inflammatory 
nature of the charges made by the Division against Petitioners, 
the propensity of key witnesses to make outrageous and inflam-
matory statements to the press, and the highly prejudicial nature 
of the evidence which might be introduced, Petitioners, even if 
they were ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would, in 
all likelihood, lose their dental practices and personal reputa-
tions as a consequence of publicity in this matter. That any 
hearing on the merits will be highly publicized by the press and 
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other media is extremely likely; the Salt Lake Tribune has al-
ready intervened in opposition to Petitioners' motion to close the 
proceedings, and K.W., one of the more flambouyant witnesses for 
the Division, has already appeared on local and national televi-
sion and made statements about the case. This relatively small 
amount of publicity has already had serious repercussions for 
Petitioners. Should the hearing on the merits of the case become 
a Mmedia event,M as would be the logical consequence of the Divi-
sion's order, the ensuing publicity will only cause irreparable, 
uncontainable, and incalculable damage to Petitioners' reputations 
and livelihoods. For this reason alone, judicial review of the 
open hearing order is critical to the administration of justice in 
this case. 
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similar-
ly, needs immediate judicial attention; the Division is only able 
to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to 
the present proceeding, the basis for its ruling that the hearing 
should be open to the press and public, because of its order 
making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law Judge, the 
trier of fact. The order identifying the Board as the presiding 
officer responsible for factual findings is, therefore, the cause 
of the public hearing issue. If the A.L.J, were the trier of 
fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then 
the Division, in all probability, could not order an open hearing. 
Further, there is a substantial chance that this order, which 
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allows the Division to Hswitch,f presiding officers at will during 
the course of this single matter, will result in substantial 
arbitrariness and prejudice to Petitioners. 
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as 
a result of the remaining orders, which prejudice could be avoided 
if Petitioners were granted interlocutory review. Central to 
Petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for and 
history of promiscuity, and evidence of her previous, extensive, 
and ongoing behavior pattern of seducing not only other medical 
practitioners but many other persons. As a consequence of the 
order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual history, Petitio-
ners ' defense will be substantially impaired. This problem should 
be remedied immediately, being an evidentiary issue which could 
become moot after the rendition of a final order because petitio-
ners will not be able, under the order, to even proffer, let alone 
prove substantial evidence necessary for their defense, making an 
incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order. 
Accordingly, if Petitioners are required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies by obtaining a final agency order, they 
will be irreparably harmed. Because this irreparable harm will 
conceivably destroy Petitioners' personal and professional lives, 
regardless of the outcome of this proceeding, it is substantially 
greater than any interest the state may have in requiring exhaus-
tion of remedies. Consequently, this case is an appropriate one 
for interlocutory review. 
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In summary, Petitioners can not only show one but both of the 
circumstances set forth in section 63-46b-14(2)(b), that the 
available administrative remedies are inadequate, and that exhaus-
tion of remedies would result in irreparable harm. 
The Utah Constitution, art. I, sec. 11, states, in part, that 
11
 [a] 11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessarily delay • • • • " Should Petitioners be barred from 
their interlocutory appeal, they will be irreparably injured in 
their reputations and businesses, and will have no recourse to the 
courts to attempt to resolve the problem prior to the occurance of 
the injury. Such denial of judicial recourse is a violation of 
Petitioners' constitutional rights. 
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, granted 
by statute, over interlocutory appeals, including interlocutory 
appeals from administrative actions, provided that: (1) There is 
no adequate administrative remedy, or (2) the petitioner will be 
irreparably harmed out of proportion to the benefit expected from 
exhausting administrative remedies, if forced to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies, including obtaining a final administrative 
order. In the present case, there is not only no administrative 
remedy, but the pursuit of a final order under the present decrees 
would result in incalculable damage to Petitioners' reputations 
and livelihoods regardless of the outcome of this proceeding. 
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This Court should, therefore, find that the Court of Appeals erred 
in denying Petitioners' Petition for Review. 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PROVISIONS OF RULE 
65B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for 
relief to be granted under its provisions "where no other plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy exists." If this Court should deter-
mine that a Petition for Review is unavailable to Petitioners, it 
should, alternatively, find that review by the Court of Appeals of 
the orders at issue is permissible under rule 65B. 
Under rule 65B, which was enacted in its present form in 
1991, relief is available for several categories of injury, in-
cluding the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public autho-
rity. Utah R. Civ, P. 65(B)(e) (1992). Under subsection (e)(2), 
"[appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion 
n 
. . . . 
Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed 
recently, the substantive intent behind the rule and the require-
ments for its application have not changed over the last several 
decades. The Utah appellate courts have given instruction as to 
how this rule is to be applied. Most instructive are the guide-
lines set forth in Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 
(1956): 
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(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction 
or is proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction and there 
is no adequate remedy, the writ should issue as a matter 
of right. 
(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without 
jurisdiction, but it appears that there is an adequate 
remedy, the writ should generally not issue, but the 
court is not entirely without discretion. 
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it 
appears that by an erroneous order it has placed one 
party in a position where he will be irreparably injured 
and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury 
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise 
of its sound discretion use the writ as a procedure for 
immediate review. 
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction 
and there is an adequate remedy, the writ should never 
issue. 
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes. Rules (2) and (3) 
are guidelines. 
Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for City of Ocrden. 112 Utah 
36, 185 P.2d 256, 261 (1947). 
In the present case, Petitioners are appealing from orders of 
an administrative agency which are, in their view, abuses of the 
agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within subsection (e) 
of rule 65B. This situation also falls within section (3) of the 
Anderson guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the 
matter but the erroneous orders of the Division are placing 
petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured 
absent immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy 
of any sort available for Petitioners. That Petitioners will be 
irreparably injured has been discussed in detail in the preceeding 
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section. Accordingly, the Court may use this as a procedure for 
intermediate review if Petitioners have no adequate remedy to 
prevent irreparable injury. 
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law 
cannot avail himself of a rule 65B petition. See Crist v. Maoleton 
Citv, 28 Utah 2d 7, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) (petitioners did 
not avail themselves of readily available remedies at law, so 
"placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus11). Should this Court determine that the Utah Court of 
Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory 
administrative appeal under the provisions of § 78-2a-3(2) and S 
63-46b-14(2), petitioners have no available or adequate remedy. 
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no available or 
adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B petition is available. For 
example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield 
Citv, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action 
for extraordinary relief was the appropriate vehicle for obtaining 
review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial of a 
conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no 
statutory provision for review of a city council action. Petitio-
ners, should this Court determine that interlocutory review is 
otherwise unavailable, will be similarly situated with Davis 
County; a rule 65B writ should, therefore, be available to Petitio-
ners. 
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Accordingly, even if this Court determines that an inter-
locutory appeal is unavailable under sections 78-2a-3(2) and 63-
46b-14(2), it should find that the Court of Appeals erred in 
denying Petitioners' Petition because Petitioners are entitled to 
bring this Petition under rule 65B. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the Order of the 
Court of Appeals denying Petitioners' Petition for Review on either 
of two alternative theories: Petitioners are entitled to inter-
locutory review of non-final orders of the Division on the grounds 
that such review is authorized under the (1) jurisdictional 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) and S 63-46b-14(2)# or 
(2) procedures for extraordinary relief set forth in rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this Qj^^k day of June, 1992. 
Jacksor^ Howard, J] 
Leslie Slaugh, and 
Linda J. Barclay, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
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This matter is before the court upon a petition for review 
of a non-final administrative order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. In 
light of this ruling, it is further ORDERED that respondent's 
motion to accept a late filed response is denied. 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO 
CLOSE HEARING 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the 
hearing in the above-entitled matter to all members of the press 
and public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum 
opposing that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a petition 
tc intervene with respect to the mccion. By Order, dated July 2, 
1991, the Court granted that petition and the Intervener's 
memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was filed on July 
3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the submissions by the 
Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 and July 10, 1991, 
respectively. 
Oral argument on the motion was conducted on April 1, 1992 
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists 
Board. Aside from the merits of the motion, the narrow issue 
initially presented was the manner in which the motion should be 
addressed. Specifically, the issue is whether the motion is one 
properly before the administrative law judge or the Board. At 
the conclusion of argument in that regard, the Court entered an 
order, the terms of which are restated as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Respondents assert parties to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding have a statutory right to be present at any hearing, 
but urge the press and the public have no such right. 
Respondents thus contend the presiding officer may take 
appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing and 
may thus exclude the press and public in an appropriate case. 
Respondents further assert the presiding officer in this 
proceeding is the administrative law judge. Since the Open and 
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et seq., 
hereinafter, the Act) only applies to meetings convened by a 
public body which consists of two or more persons, Respondents 
urge it is the administrative law judge - as the presiding 
officer - who is authorized to determine whether the subsequent 
hearing in this proceeding should be closed. 
The Division and the Intervenor jointly contend the Act 
applies to the hearing to be conducted in this proceeding, any 
decision to close the hearing is thus governed by the Act and 
that determination is to be made by the public body before whom 
the hearing will be held. 
The Act generally governs meetings convened by a public 
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body, as those terms are defined in Sections 52-4-2(1) and (2), 
respectively. Sections 52-4-2(1) defines "meeting" as: 
. . . the convening of a public body, with 
a quorum present, whether in person or by 
means of electronic equipment, for the 
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter 
over which the public body has jurisdiction 
or advisory power.... 
Section 52-4-2(2) defines "public body" as: 
. . . any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or 
its political subdivisions which consists of 
two or more persons that expends, disburses, 
or is supported in whole or in part by tax 
revenue and is vested with the authority to 
make decisions regarding the publics 
business . . . . 
On April 11, 1977, an opinion was issued (#77-94) by James 
L. Barker of the Office of the Utah Attorney General to Ronald E. 
Casper, then Director of the Department of Registration, now 
known as the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
The just-stated opinion was in response to various questions 
concerning the scope of the Act with regard to meetings conducted 
by boards and committees established pursuant to Section 53-1-1 
et seq. The opinion set forth the conclusion that such boards 
and committees are "public bodies" with the meaning of Section 
52-4-2 and that quasi-judicial hearings "to determine findings 
and recommendations for disciplinary action" are subject to the 
Act. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-l et 
seq., hereinafter, the UAPA) does not expressly provide that 
hearings conducted in formal adjudicative proceedings are subject 
to the requirements of Section 52-4-1 et seq. Section 63-46b-8 
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generally sets forth hearing procedures applicable in formal 
adjudicative proceedings. Subsection (1)(i) of that statute 
merely provides all hearings "shall be open to all parties". 
However, Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory 
Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of the UAPA (Code 
Co. at 14) provide as follows: 
Non-parties may also be afforded the 
opportunity to observe hearings. See e.g., 
Section 52-4-1 et seq. (Open and Public 
Meetings Act). 
Given the foregoing, the Court concludes the Act applies to 
hearings conducted in professional disciplinary licensure 
proceedings initiated by the Division if the presiding officer at 
the hearing is a "public body" within the meaning of Section 52-
4-2(2). The Court also notes Section 13-1-11, which authorizes 
the Department to employ administrative law judges "to conduct 
hearings for the department". If an administrative law judge is 
the presiding officer duly authorized to conduct a hearing and 
subsequently enter an order pursuant to Section 13-1-12(1) (a) , 
the Act would not apply because an administrative law judge is 
not a "public body" within the meaning of the Act. 
Section 63-46b-8(2) of the UAPA expressly provides that 
nothing in that section precludes the administrative law judge -
as the presiding officer - "from taking appropriate measures 
necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing". Further, 
R151-46b-10(B) of the rules of procedure which govern 
departmental adjudicative proceedings provides: 
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Unless ordered by the department for good 
cause, if a hearing is conducted, it shall be 
open to the public. 
Pursuant to the just-quoted rule, an administrative law judge -
as the presiding officer authorized to conduct a hearing - could 
determine to close the hearing for good cause (e.g., an in camera 
proceeding could be conducted, as was done at the conclusion of 
Respondents7 April 1, 1992 voir dire examination of the Board). 
Such a determination would not be governed by the Act. 
However, it is the Board which is duly authorized to act as 
the presiding officer in the subsequent hearing in this 
proceeding with respect to the entry of findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and any recommended order regarding 
Respondents' licenses. Thus, the hearing to be held is governed 
by the Act and the decision whether to close the hearing is a 
matter properly addressed to the Board. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to close 
the hearing to be conducted before the Board is a matter governed 
by the Act. The Board - as the presiding officer authorized to 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended 
order subsequent to any such hearing - shall address Respondents' 
motion and determine whether the hearing should be closed, 
consistent with the provisions of the Act. 
Dated this 'T&0~ aay 0f April, 1992 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON RESPONDENTS7 
MOTION TO CLOSE HEARING 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Sharon E. Sonnenreich for the Salt Lake Tribune 
BY THE BOARD: 
On June 20, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to close the 
hearing in this proceeding to all members of the press and 
public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed a memorandum in 
opposition to that motion and the Salt Lake Tribune filed a 
petition to intervene with respect to the motion. By Order, 
dated July 2, 1991, the Court granted that petition and the 
Intervener's memorandum in opposition to Respondents' motion was 
filed on July 3, 1991. Respondents filed replies to the 
submissions by the Division and the Intervenor on July 9, 1991 
and July 10, 1991, respectively. 
Oral argument on Respondents' motion was conducted on April 
1, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, and the Dentists and Dental Hygienists 
Board. Members of the Board present were Mark L. Christensen, 
Paul R. Lunt, Elizabeth A. Reinerth, Max A. Blackham, Floyd R. 
Tanner, and Roger E. Grua. The remaining Board member, William 
E. Dunn, was also present, but Mr. Dunn had been recused from any 
participation as a Board member in this proceeding and did not 
participate with respect to the pending motion. 
After the conclusion of oral argument, the Board deliberated 
the matter. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 52-4-1 et seq., 
the Board subsequently entered an order, the terms of which are 
restated as follows: 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondents' motion to close the 
hearing to be conducted before the Board is denied. 
Specifically, Dr. Lunt, Ms. Reinerth, Dr. Blackham, and Dr. 
Tanner vote to conduct a hearing in this proceeding which shall 
be open to the press and public. Dr. Christensen and Dr. Grua 
would close the hearing. 
Dated this _2E_Tday of April, 1992 
FOR THE BOARD 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE 
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant 
to an August 17, 1989 Notice of Agency Action- The notice, which 
was signed by David E. Robinson as the Director of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, recited a hearing 
would be conducted on October 4, 1989 and indicated the presiding 
Qffi^ o>- £•£ t*is hearincr would be J. Steven E3ciund Administrative 
Law Judge for the Department of Commerce. 
On April 30, 1991, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 
Oral argument was conducted with respect to that motion on May 
23, 1991. Prior to conclusion of that argument, counsel for 
Respondents made inquiry regarding the procedures which would 
govern any subsequent hearing conducted to address whether a 
disciplinary sanction would enter as to Respondents' licenses. 
The Court informed counsel for Respondents as to the respective 
roles of both the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board and the 
Administrative Law Judge in that process. 
Respondents now seek further clarification, urging the 
presiding officer in this proceeding should be the Administrative 
Law Judge, as initially indicated in the August 17, 1989 notice. 
Respondents assert the Administrative Law Judge should enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and then submit any 
recommendation to the Board for its review. On April 1, 1992, 
oral argument was presented as to the just-referenced matter and 
the Administrative Law Judge entered an order, the terms of which 
are restated as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert this proceeding should be conducted in a 
manner consistent with that set forth in the August 17, 1989 
notice. Specifically, Respondents urge no basis exists to 
designate various presiding officers to act in different 
capacities during the course of this proceeding. The Division 
contends the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter, the 
UAPA) provides such flexibility and does not require the same 
individual or body of individuals to act as the presiding officer 
for all purposes throughout an adjudicative proceeding. 
The UAPA clearly provides that different individuals or 
entities may act as the presiding officer with regard to a given 
phase of a proceeding. For example, Section 63-46b-3(2)(a) 
provides the notice of agency action shall be signed by "a 
presiding officer". Mr. Robinson thus acted as the presiding 
officer for that purpose when the August 17, 1989 notice of 
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agency action was issued. Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(x) also 
requires the notice of agency action to identify the "name, 
title, mailing address and telephone number" of the presiding 
officer. The confusion in this case has been prompted by the 
August 17, 1989 notice, which failed to specifically and 
adequately inform Respondents as to the respective role of the 
Board and the Administrative Law Judge in this proceeding. In 
that regard, it is necessary to review the UAPA, the legislative 
history of Section 13-1-12 and Section 58-1-16 and the nature of 
agency practice pursuant to those statutes. 
The UAPA, which became effective January 1, 1988, generally 
applies to all state agencies. Section 63-46b-2(h) defines 
"presiding officer" as: 
. . . an agency head, or an individual or 
body of individuals designated by the agency 
head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to 
conduct an adjudicative proceeding. 
Section 63-46b-2(h) further provides: 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not 
compromised, an agency may substitute one 
presiding officer for another during any 
proceeding; 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding 
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continue as the presiding officer during all 
phases of the proceeding. 
The just-quoted statutes provide some guidance and limitations 
regarding who can serve as presiding officers. See Comments of 
Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the Drafting and 
Interpretation of the UAPA (Code Co. at 11). Section 63-46b-
2(h)(ii) and (iii) jointly operate to provide that different 
individuals or entities may act as the presiding officer with 
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respect to a given phase of a proceeding and, significantly, it 
is not necessary any given presiding officer during an earlier 
stage of a proceeding continue as the presiding officer 
throughout the latter stages of the proceeding. 
Section 13-1-8.5(1) provides the Department of Commerce and 
its various divisions shall comply with the UAPA in their 
adjudicative proceedings. Section 13-1-1 provides the Department 
may employ administrative law judges to conduct hearings before 
the Department. Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12 
stated: 
(1) The administrative law judge or an 
occupational board or representative 
committee, with assistance from the 
administrative law judge, shall render a 
written recommendation of administrative 
action, supported by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law . . . 
Section 13-1-12 now provides: 
(1)(a) At the close of an adjudicative 
proceeding, the administrative law judge or 
an occupational board or representative 
committee with assistance from the 
administrative law judge, shall issue an 
order. 
Section 58-1-1 et seq. both establishs and generally governs 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Section 
58-1-16(1)(a) expressly provides the Division shall comply with 
the UAPA in all disciplinary licensure proceedings. Prior to 
January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 stated as follows: 
(1)(a) Before suspending, revoking, or 
refusing to renew a license, and before 
issuing a cease and desist order, the divison 
shall notify the licensee or license 
applicant of the action by letter deposited 
in the post office with postage prepaid 
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addressed to the last address of the licensee 
or license applicant known to the division, 
that the action is being considered and that 
the division will provide the licensee or 
license applicant with a formal hearing 
before an appropriate hearing officer or 
board, as designated bv the director. 
Section 58-1-16(2) further stated: 
All hearings provided under this section 
shall be held before an appropriate hearing 
officer or board, as designated bv the 
director, pursuant to Chapter 1, Title 13. 
The board or hearing officer shall render a 
written recommendation supported by the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made 
at the hearing together with a recommendation 
for action. The director, with the 
concurrence of the appropriate board, may 
issue a written order based on the 
recommendations but is not bound to follow 
the recommendations of the administrative law 
judge or the hearing officer. The written 
order of the director shall include the 
rationale and justification for the decision. 
If the director does not issue an order 
within 10 days after the administrative law 
judge or the hearing officer has made the 
recommendations, the recommendations shall be 
binding on the parties to the administrative 
action. 
Section 58-1-16 was amended, effective January 1, 1988. That 
statute now provides: 
(a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be 
held before an a^oro^riate ^residing officer 
as designated by the director; 
(b) The presiding officer shall make 
written recommendations for action, findings 
of fact/ and conclusions of law; 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of 
the appropriate board, may issue a written 
order based on the recommendations but is not 
bound to follow the recommendations of the 
presiding officer; 
(d) If the director does not issue an 
order within ten days after the presiding 
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officer has made the recommendations, the 
recommendations of the presiding officer 
shall become the order. 
Section 58-7-2(6) specifically governs possible entry of a 
disciplinary sanction with respect to an individual licensed to 
practice dentistry. That statute provides: 
The division, upon recommendation of the 
board, may suspend or revoke the license of a 
dentist or dental hygienist for 
unprofessional conduct and may reinstate such 
license. 
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 58-1-16 provided for a 
hearing before "an appropriate hearing officer or board" and 
recognized that either the board or the hearing officer was 
authorized to render a written recommendation. Subsequent 
amendments to Section 58-1-16 now generally provide that 
adjudicative proceedings amy be held before "an appropriate 
presiding officer". The statute, as amended, reflects no 
legislative intent that the presiding officer could not be either 
an appropriate hearing officer or the board. 
Prior to January 1, 1988, Section 13-1-12 authorized either 
an administrative law judge, or an occupational board or 
representative committee with assistance from the administrative 
law judge, to issue findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
recommendation for action. Although that statute was 
subsequently amended, it still authorizes either the 
administrative law judge, or the board or committee with 
assistance from the administrative law judge, to issue a order at 
the close of an adjudicative proceeding (i.e. after the 
conclusion of a hearing). 
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The Court takes notice of the fact that the Division's 
practice has been to to designate an administrative law judge as 
presiding officer for the purposes of ruling on questions of law 
and procedure and to also designate the appropriate board of the 
specific licensed profession to enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a recommendation. Such has consistently 
been the prevailing agency practice, both prior to and after the 
1988 amendments to Section 58-1-16 and Section 13-1-12• It 
appears that practice has been employed to utilize the respective 
expertise of an administrative law judge, consistent with the 
provisions of Section 13-1-11, as well as the recognized 
expertise of the various boards set forth in Title 58. 
To the extent the term "presiding officer" - used in Section 
58-1-16 - is ambiguous, a reasonable administrative 
interpretation and practice should be given some weight. Salt 
Lake City v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 568 P.2d 738 (1977); Cannon 
v. Gardner, Utah, 611 P.2d 1207 (1980). Given the reasonable 
administrative interpretation of - and practice under - the 
statutes in question, the Court concludes the instant 
adjudicative proceeding may properly be conducted in a similar 
manner and the August 17, 1989 notice failed to accurately 
identify that procedure. 
Thus, supplemental notice is now provided that the Board 
will act as the presiding officer in this proceeding to thus 
render a written recommended order, supported by the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Consistent with Section 13-1-
12(1)(a), further notice is now provided the administrative law 
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judge will assist the Board in preparing that order for its 
issuance. Consistent with Section 13-1-11 and the long standing 
practice in professional disciplinary licensure hearings, notice 
is further provided the administrative law judge will rule on 
questions of law and procedure which may arise, both prior to and 
during the hearing. 
One further matter should be addressed. The Court notes 
Respondents previously filed a June 20, 1991 motion to recuse 
David E. Robinson from participating in this proceeding. 
Further, the Division has filed a March 10, 1992 notice, whereby 
Mr. Robinson has recused himself in that regard. Pursuant to 
Section 58-1-16, Mr. Robinson could have been otherwise 
authorized to act as the presiding officer as to any findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order entered by the 
Board. 
This Court's March 19, 1992 Scheduling Order indicated oral 
argument could be presented as to whether any recommended order 
submittted by the Board may properly be subject to review and 
subsequent action by David L. Buhler, Executive Director of the 
Department of Commerce. The UAPA is silenr as to both any 
procedure which governs possible recusal of a presiding officer 
and the consequences of any such recusal. However, Section 13-1-
12(2) provides as follows: 
If a division director is unable for any 
reason to fairly review or rule upon an order 
of the administrative law judge or a board or 
committee, the executive director shall 
review and rule upon the order. 
Given the language of the just-quoted statute, it would appear 
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David L. Buhler is thus authorized to rule on any findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order subsequently 
entered by the Board in this proceeding. The Court will contact 
respective counsel on April 13, 1992 to identify whether 
Respondents anticipate filing any motion to recuse Mr. Buhler 
from participation in this proceeding. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Dentists and Dental 
Hygienists Board shall act as the presiding officer in this 
proceeding to render a written recommended order, supported by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Further, the 
administrative law judge will assist the Board in preparing that 
order for its issuance and the administrative law judge shall 
rule on all questions of law and procedure which may arise during 
the pendency of this proceeding. 
It is further ordered that any motion to recuse David L. 
Buhler from participation in this proceeding shall be filed 
within ten (10) days after the Court has conducted a conference 
call with respective counsel to determine whether any such motion 
is anticipated. 
Dated this rf®^00* day of April, 1992 
J.USteven (Eklund 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN AND 
BRENT D. HANSEN 
TO PRACTICE AS DENTISTS : 
AND TO PRESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER : 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : 
ORDER ON DIVISION'S 
MOTION- IN LIMINE 
: 
: CASE NO. OPL-89-47 
Appearances: 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
By motion, dated June 14, 1991, the Division seeks to 
exclude certain evidence in the hearing to be conducted before 
the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board in the above-entitled 
matter. Specifically, the Division urges: (1) evidence 
concerning K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation 
should be excluded; and (2) evidence of that nature as to other 
witnesses similarly situated should also be excluded. 
Respondents filed a response to the just-described motion on 
July 1, 1991 and the Division's reply was filed July 2, 1991. 
Oral argument was conducted April 1, 1992 before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, 
and the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court, now being fully advised in the premises, enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
The Division contends none of the above-referenced evidence 
is relevant as to whether Respondents engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as alleged in the August 17, 1989 Petition. The 
Division further asserts the evidence should be excluded because 
its probative value - if any - is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence would confuse the 
issues and "drag out details of K.W.'s private life for no 
legitimate reason or purpose". 
Respondents note Count I of the petition, which contains an 
allegation they took "sexual liberties" with certain patients. 
Respondents urge that allegation places the sexual activity of 
the supposed victims at issue, the Board must determine whether 
the actions allegedly taken were "liberties" or "invited 
responses" and evidence of the supposed victim's consent is thus 
relevant. 
Respondents also contend K.W.'s past sexual conduct 
demonstrates her propensity to brazenly pursue sexual relations, 
the conduct which allegedly occurred between her and Respondents 
was prompted by her aggressive suggestion and the alleged conduct 
thus reflects an isolated incident not indicative of any public 
threat. Respondents thus assert evidence of K.W.'s consenting 
participation is a relevant mitigating factor to be considered by 
the Board as to any disciplinary sanction which may be warranted 
in this proceeding. 
Section 63-46b-8 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(hereinafter, the UAPA) provides: 
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(1) . . . in all formal adjudicative 
proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as 
follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall 
regulate the course of the hearing 
to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to avoid all the 
parties reasonable opportunity to 
present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon 
objection by a party, the presiding 
officer: 
(i) may exclude 
evidence that is 
irrelevant, immaterial, 
or unduly repetitous . . 
• • 
Comments of the Utah Administative Law Advisory Committee on the 
drafting and interpretation of the UAPA reflect as follows: 
The intent of the Advisory Committee was 
that the grant of authority to the presiding 
officer found in Section 63-46b-8(1)(a) 
should be broadly construed. (Code Co. 1988 
at 13-14) . 
The above-quoted statute does not expressly make the Utah Rules 
of Evidence applicable in formal adjudicative proceedings. 
However, Section 63-46b-8(1)(b)(i) allows a presiding officer to 
exclude irrelevant evidence. Instructively, Rule 401 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as: 
. . . evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
Rule 403 generally provides that relevant evidence "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or 
misleading the jury . . . " 
The evidence which is the subject of this pending motion 
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specifically involves Rule 404, which states: 
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(3) Evidence of the character of 
a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608 and 609. 
Rule 608 governs evidence offered concerning the character and 
conduct of a witness as follows: 
(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting his credibility, other than 
conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
They may, however, in the discretion of the 
court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning his 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness 
or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. 
During oral argument on the pending motion, Respondents 
asserted K.W.'s credibility (or that of any other witness) may be 
assailed by evidence of the prior sexual history or reputation of 
that witness. Such assertion is without merit for numerous 
reasons. First, Rule 608 expressly precludes extrinsic evidence 
of that nature for such a purpose. Further, prior sexual history 
of a witness is not probative of the veracity of the witness. In 
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
Because the law does not and should not 
recognize any connection between the veracity 
of a witness and her sexual promiscuity, the 
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proposed evidence has no relevancy in regard 
to the truthfulness of her testimony . . .. 
Such evidence, if offered to attack the credibility of a witness, 
should be particularly excluded because "its primary purpose and 
effect" would be to "cast aspersions" on the witness and 
"besmirch her character" in the eyes of the Board. See Bullock 
v. Unoricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975). 
The remaining issue is whether the evidence in question is 
admissible regarding K.W.'s possible consent (or that of any 
other patient) to the alleged conduct of either of the 
Respondents. In State v. Johns, supra, the Court stated: 
. . . in cases involving forcible rape or 
aggravated sexual assault, the fact a woman 
has consented to sexual activity in the past 
under different circumstances and with 
individuals other than the defendant has 
little if any relevancy to the question of 
her consent and the situation involved here. 
However, . . . there are some cases in 
which the reputation of the prosecutrix and 
in which specific prior sexual activity may 
become relevant and its probative value 
outweighs the detrimental impact of its 
introduction. Id. at 1263-64. 
The Court thus set forth the following test: 
While the balancing of the probative value 
of the evidence and its detrimental effect is 
entrusted to the discretion of the trial 
judge, in the usual case such evidence, 
either of general reputation or specific 
prior acts, is simply not relevant to any 
issue in the rape prosecution including the 
consent of the prosecutrix. Such evidence is 
admissible only when the court finds under 
the circumstances of the particular case such 
evidence is relevant to a material factual 
dispute and its probative value outweighs the 
inherent danger of unfair prejudice to the 
prosecutrix, confusion of issues, unwarranted 
invasion of the complaintant's privacy, 
consideration of undue delay and time waste, 
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and the needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. Id at 1264. (Emphasis added.) 
Although this is not a criminal proceeding, the just-stated 
principles are persuasive and should also be applied in this 
case. 
Evidence of consensual participation by a patient with 
respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly undertaken by either 
of the Respondents has significant probative value as to both the 
circumstances which may have prompted whatever occurred between 
Respondents and a given patient and the nature of any 
disciplinary sanction which should enter if unprofessional 
conduct is found to have occurred. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
recognized the vital function of cross-examination in 
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. D.B. v. Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 
(1989). Respondents may thus cross-examine any given patient 
concerning the specific circumstances of this case and the 
possible existence of the above-referenced mitigating factor. 
Further, evidence of a patient's prior consensual sexual 
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the 
context of a physician/patient relationship has some probative 
value, insofar as it relates to the issue of consensual 
participation of that patient in this case. Within the just-
stated constraints, Respondents may cross-examine such a witness 
in this proceeding as to that matter. 
However, any evidence of a witness' general prior sexual 
history or reputation should be excluded for various reasons. 
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The right to cross-examine a witness "does not entail the right 
to harrass, annoy or humiliate [a] witness on cross-examination". 
State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), quoting Evans 
v. Alaska, 550 P.2d 830, 837 (Alaska 1976). Character evidence 
of prior sexual behavior is often of "slight probative value, is 
very prejudicial and may confuse the issues at trial". State v. 
Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 644 (Utah 1988). As that Court further 
stated: 
One of the trial judge's duties is to 
regulate the admission of character evidence 
so as to exclude evidence which tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main 
question of what actually happened on a 
particular occasion. This process prevents 
the trier of fact from rewarding one 
individual and punishing another because of 
their respective characters, instead of 
focusing upon the evidence in the case. Id. 
Given the foregoing, the Court necessarily concludes any 
evidence of a witness7 prior sexual history or reputation -
beyond the limited scope of cross-examination identified herein -
would unduly subject either K.W. or another witness similarly 
situated to humiliation and constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
their privacy. The degree of unfair prejudice which would result 
is thus clear. 
Importantly, such evidence would also tend to confuse the 
issues and mislead the Board by shifting what should be the 
predominant focus of this proceeding (i.e., the nature of 
whatever conduct occurred between Respondents and K.W. or other 
patients) to the myriad relationships which existed or conduct 
which occurred regarding any given patient and a third party. 
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Further, if any extrinsic evidence of that nature were allowed, 
it would also require the Board to assess the credibility of the 
various witnesses who testify regarding those relationships. 
Such would be particularly indirect and potentially fruitless 
process with respect to the Board's primary charge, which is to 
determine the nature of Respondents' conduct with respect to K.W. 
or other patients. 
Respondents urge the Board is more capable than a common 
jury of assessing the evidence sought to be admitted and such 
evidence should thus be allowed, even though of minimal probative 
value, because a lesser risk of undue prejudice exists in this 
administrative setting. The Court is not persuaded Rule 403 is 
any less applicable in this adjudicative proceeding than it would 
be in a criminal or civil action. Simply put, the initial and 
continuing focus of this proceeding should be directed toward 
whatever conduct was undertaken by either Respondent with respect 
to those individuals referenced in the petition, the 
circumstances which prompted whatever may have occurred, whether 
any basis exists to impose a disciplinary sanction as to either 
Respondent and the nature of any sanction which is warranted. 
Given the disposition of the pending motion, Respondents 
will thus be allowed to present and support their theory of the 
case, subject to restrictions which are necessary to ensure the 
evidence received in this proceeding is admitted within the 
proper scope of those issues to be addressed by the Board. 
ORDER 
Evidence of consensual participation by K.W. or another 
8 
patient with respect to unprofessional conduct allegedly 
undertaken by either of the Respondents is admissible in this 
proceeding. Respondents may thus cross-examine those witnesses 
concerning those circumstances in an attempt to establish the 
existence of such a mitigating factor. 
Further, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' prior sexual 
behavior with a licensed health care professional within the 
context of a physician/patient relationship shall be also 
admissible, both on cross-examination of that witness and for 
possible impeachment purposes on rebuttal. 
However, evidence of K.W.'s or another witness' general 
prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded for the 
reasons set forth herein. 
Dated this day of April, 1992 
a 
Steven /Eklund 
d n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
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Appearances: 
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Professional Licensing 
Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh for Respondents 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
The instant adjudicative proceeding was initiated pursuant 
to an August 17, 1989 notice of agency action. Sparing detail, 
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, 1991 and oral 
argument was conducted on May 23, 1991. Prior to the conclusion 
of oral argument, counsel for Respondents made inquiry regarding 
the standard of proof which would govern any subsequent hearing 
conducted to address whether a disciplinary sanction should enter 
as to Respondents' licenses. 
The Court thus requested both parties to submit memoranda as 
to that matter. The Division filed its brief on June 11, 1991, 
Respondents filed their memorandum on June 21, 1991 and the 
Division's final reply was filed July 1, 1991. Oral argument was 
subsequently conducted April 1, 1992 and the Court took the 
matter under advisement. 
The Administrative Law Judge, now being fully advised in the 
premises, enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend the applicable standard of proof in 
this proceeding should be clear and convincing evidence• 
Specifically, Respondents urge this proceeding is quasi-criminal 
in nature and that the Division seeks to impose a punitive 
sanction which would impinge on their constitutionally protected 
rights. Respondents also assert Utah courts have required clear 
and convincing proof in a civil contempt case and such a case is 
"strikingly similar" to this professional licensure disciplinary 
proceeding• Given both the nature of this proceeding and 
Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their ability to 
practice their chosen profession, they contend the Division 
should be required to prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The Division asserts Utah courts adhere to the general rule 
that the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a 
preponderance of the evidence. The Division notes there is no 
statutorily established standard of proof which governs the 
instant proceeding and many other courts in other states have 
utilized the preponderance standard in professional licensure 
disciplinary proceedings. 
In Rogers v. Division of Real Estate. 790 P.2d 102 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals described a professional 
licensure disciplinary proceeding as: 
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. . . a special, somewhat unique, statutory 
proceeding, in which the disciplinary board 
investigates the conduct of a member of the 
profession to determine if disciplinary 
action is appropriate to maintain sound 
professional standards of conduct and protect 
the public. Id. at 105-06. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also recognized that a person 
"whose freedom to pursue his profession is seriously restricted 
by an official action . . . may compel the government to afford 
him a hearing complying with the traditional requirements of due 
process". D.B. v. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Endler 
v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal.2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 304 (1968). 
No statute exists which establishes the standard of proof 
applicable in this proceeding. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Sections 63-46b-l et seq., hereinafter, the 
UAPA), those statutes governing the Department of Commerce 
(Sections 13-1-1 et seq.) and the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing (Sections 58-1-1 et seq.) are all silent 
in that regard, although Section 63-46b-l6(4)(g) of the UAPA 
provides the standard on judicial review as "substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court". 
Further, Utah courts have not specifically addressed the 
appropriate standard of proof in professional licensure 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Division. Thus, the 
issue presented should be resolved based on a review of analogous 
cases decided by the courts of this state and the more persuasive 
decisions rendered by courts in other states. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that driver license 
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revocation proceedings are not necessarily "criminal" or "quasi-
criminal" in nature, Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 
595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1979). In Ward v. Smith. 573 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1978), the Court held a parole revocation hearing was an 
administrative, rather than a criminal, proceeding. Id, at 782, 
See also Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah L986) ; Walker v. 
Board of Pardons, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). 
In further contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, 
the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that a driver license 
revocation proceeding "requires proof only by a preponderance of 
the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt". Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1982). The preponderance 
standard also applies in a parole revocation proceeding. Johns 
v. Shulsen, supra, at 1338; Walker v. Board of Pardons, supra. 
Respondents contend their respective interests in the 
continuation of their livelihood are deserving of more protection 
than that afforded a motorist merely faced with the loss of 
driving privileges or a parolee who might lose their conditional 
freedom. Even assuming Respondents are correct, many courts in 
sister states have applied the preponderance standard of proof in 
professional licensure disciplinary proceedings. Rucker v. 
Michigan Board of Medicine, 138 Mich. App. 209, 360 N.W.2d 154, 
155 (1984); In re Schultz. 375 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. App. 
1985); Forster v. Board, 103 N.W. 776, 714 P.2d 580, 582 (1986); 
Eaves v. Board of Medical Examiners, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 
1991). 
Other courts have utilized a clear and convincing evidence 
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test. Ettinaer v. Board of 1-iedical Quality Assurance. 185 
Cal.Rptr. 601, 603 (1982); In re Zar. 434 N.W.2d 598f 602 (S.D. 
1989) . In Hoaan v. Mississippi Board of Nursingr 457 So.2d 931 
(Miss. 1984), the Court characterized a license revocation 
proceeding as "penal" in nature and thus required proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. Id. at 934. The South Dakota Supreme 
Court has emphasized a higher standard of proof should apply in 
such a proceeding due to the interest involved (i.e., a 
professional's career), stating: 
The revocation of a license of a 
professional [person] carries with it dire 
consequences. It not only involves 
necessarily disgrace and humiliation, but it 
means the end of [his or her] professional 
career. 
In re Zar, supra. 
However, a professional licensure disciplinary hearing is 
not a criminal proceeding in nature. See Rogers v. Division of 
Real Estate, supra, and cases cited herein. Concededly, 
Respondents' respective interests in maintaining their 
professional livelihood and the possible deprivation of that 
ability as a result of this proceeding are substantial. In re 
Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7, 14 (1982). Nevertheless, this 
Court seriously questions Respondents7 implicit suggestion that a 
license to practice dentistry represents a fundamental 
constitutional right. The New Jersey Court squarely rejected a 
similar contention in the case of In re Polk, supra, 
instructively stating as follows: 
A license to practice a profession is not a 
basic individual right. While it embraces a 
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substantial individual interest which 
deserves abundant protection, it cannot be 
equated with a fundamental right, the 
reasonable regulation of which can be 
measured and justified only by a compelling 
state interest. The right to practice 
medicine itself is granted in the interest of 
the public and is "always subject to 
reasonable regulation in the public 
interest." Id. at 17 (Citation omitted). 
In its persuasive and well reasoned decision, the Court further 
recognized the government's "paramount obligation to protect the 
general health of the public" and the right of physicians to 
practice their profession as being "necessarily subordinate to 
this governmental interest". Id at 14. Significantly, the Court 
concluded: 
We are satisfied that the preponderance of 
the evidence burden of proof is sufficient 
for purposes of an administrative 
adjudication concerning professional guilt 
and discipline against a licensed medical 
doctor. In view of the subject matter of 
such proceedings, the nature of the evidence, 
the qualifications of witnesses, the special 
expertise of the tribunal, the relative 
advantages and resources of the parties, and 
the minimal risk of inaccurate or erroneous 
factfinding and final decisionmaking, 
confidence in a final adjudication would not 
be imperiled by employing the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. These proceedings 
do not demand an enhanced burden of proof. 
Id. at 16. (All emphasis herein added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently addressed the standard 
of proof applicable in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In 
the early case of In re Hanson. 48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778 (1916), 
the Court commented that evidence in such a proceeding "should be 
clear and convincing" and such a rule "is based upon a most solid 
foundation". Id at 779. The Court later recognized the 
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applicable test as being a "clear preponderance of the evidence". 
In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 305 (1933). 
In a subsequent case, the Court stated that charges in an 
attorney disciplinary proceeding "should be clearly sustained by 
convincing proof and a fair preponderance of the evidence". In 
re McCullouah. 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939). More recently, 
the Court has stated as follows: 
We agree that because of the seriousness of 
the consequences to the attorney involved 
touching upon the important right to follow 
his vocation and make a livelihood, that such 
is the established rule (i.e., the persuasion 
of his misconduct must be by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
In re MacFarlane. 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631, 633 (1960). The 
somewhat misleading phrase "clear preponderance", as used by the 
Court in the case of In re Barclay, supra, has been defined by 
the Washington Supreme Court as follows: 
"Clear preponderance" is an intermediate 
standard of proof in these cases, requiring 
greater certainty than "simple preponderance" 
but not to the extent required under "beyond 
reasonable doubt". This intermediate 
standard reflects the unique character of 
disciplinary proceedings. The standard of 
proof is higher than the simple preponderance 
normally required in civil actions because 
the stigma associated with disciplinary 
action is generally greater than that 
associated with most tort and contract cases. 
Yet because the interests in protecting the 
public, maintaining confidence, and 
preserving the integrity of the legal 
profession also weigh heavily in these 
proceedings, the standard of proof is 
somewhat lower than the beyond reasonable 
doubt standard required in criminal 
prosecutions. 
In re Allotta, 109 Wash.2d 787, 748 P.2d 628, 630-31 (1988). 
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Respondents thus suggest the enhanced standard of proof in 
attorney disciplinary proceedings should also be applicable in 
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the 
Division- Since the underlying purpose of disciplining both 
attorneys and physicians is protection of the public, one court 
has recognized the same enhanced standard should apply to a 
practitioner of either profession. Ettinaer v. Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance, supra. 
However, the New Jersey Surpeme Court has acknowledged a 
"less stringent burden of proof" can be rationally applied in 
medical licensure proceedings "as more protective of society7s 
important interest in individual life and health". In re Polk, 
supra, at 18. Further, the Iowa Supreme Court has upheld 
dissimilar standards of proof as between those professions "where 
the regulations being compared have been established by differing 
branches of government". Eaves v. Board of Medical Quality 
Examiners, supra. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has addressed the same issue and 
applied the preponderance standard of proof in a dental licensure 
disciplinary proceeding, stating: 
We note the burden of proof in attorney 
disciplinary cases is clear and convincing 
evidence. Attorney disciplinary proceedings, 
under the supervision and control of the 
judiciary, are sui generis. Attorney 
misconduct, striking as it does, at the 
administration of our justice system, gives 
society a heightened interest in the outcome 
of attorney discipline. A higher standard of 
proof is indicated. (All citations omitted). 
In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1989). The Court nevertheless 
8 
recognized the nature of the proceeding and appropriately 
provided the following caution: 
. . . these proceedings brought on behalf 
of the state, attacking a person's 
professional and personal reputation and 
character and seeking to impose disciplinary 
sanctions, are no ordinary proceedings. We 
trust that in all professional disciplinary 
matters, the finder of fact, bearing in mind 
the gravity of the decision to be made, will 
be persuaded only by evidence with heft. The 
reputation of a profession and the reputation 
of a professional as well as the public trust 
are at stake. Id. 
Respondents cite other cases decided by the courts of this 
state where a clear and convincing standard of proof was applied. 
Wvcoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 
283 (1962); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
However, neither of those cases involved a disciplinary sanction 
with respect to a professional license. Since those cases are 
distinctly different in nature from this proceeding, the 
principles set forth therein provide no meaningful guidance for 
purposes of the matter now under review. Further, this tribunal 
has previously concluded the standard of proof which should apply 
in professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by 
the Division is a preponderance of the evidence. In re Barney 
(Case No. OPL-91-69, filed August 2, 1991). 
Based on the foregoing, a considered review of existing case 
law and the arguments presented by both parties, this Court is 
not persuaded the standard of proof previously applied in 
professional disciplinary licensure proceedings initiated by the 
Division should be abandoned. The Court further concludes the 
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clear and convincing standard of proof applied in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings in this state should not be extended as 
to govern this proceeding. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the standard of proof in this 
professional licensure disciplinary proceeding shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Dated this l*J ^ day of April, 1992 
J.Wsteven^[Eklund \ 
Administrative Law Judge 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENT BLAINE HANSEN and BRENT D. 
HANSEN, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, 
Respondent. 
PETTnON FOR REVIEW OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. OPL-89-47 
Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen, hereby petition the Utah Court of Appeals 
to permit an appeal from the interlocutory orders of the Honorable J. Steven Ecklund entered 
in this matter on the following dates: 
1. Order on Procedures Governing Disposition of Respondents' Motion To Close 
Hearing, dated April 7, 1992. 
2. Order on Respondents' Motion to Close Hearing, dated April 7, 1992. 
3. Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order, dated April 7, 1992. 
4. Order on Division's Motion in Limine, dated April 17, 1992. 
5. Order on Applicable Standard of Proof, dated April 17, 1992. 
A copy of the orders sought to be reviewed are attached, as is a brief memorandum 
explaining the jurisdictional basis for this petition for review. 
PERSONS SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED 
Petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen are the only persons substantially 
affected by these orders of the Division, although such orders, to the extent that they represent 
ongoing and established procedures of the Division, may affect all persons against whom actions 
are brought by the Division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 17, 1989, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah filed a Notice of Agency Action against 
petitioners Kent Blaine Hansen and Brent D. Hansen. The Notice of Agency Action sought to 
suspend or revoke petitioners' dental licenses for unprofessional conduct under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-2(6). Among other things, the Notice alleged that petitioners had 
violated the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-7-1.l(7)(k), (1), (q) and (r) by, among other 
things, the taking of lewd nude photographs of K.W., a patient, and performing unnecessary 
treatments in order to exchange drugs for K.W.'s sexual favors. The Notice also indicated that 
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the presiding officer would be J, Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department 
of Commerce. 
On April 30, 1991 respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. On May 23, 
1991, the Division heard oral arguments on this motion. As a result, it made a preliminary 
order as to the identity of the presiding officer. On April 1, 1992, in oral argument, 
respondents requested a clarification of the identity of the presiding officer. On April 7, 1992, 
Judge Ecklund filed a Supplemental Notice and Accompanying Order which stated that the 
Board of Dentists and Dental Hygienists would act as the presiding officer in the hearing to 
determine factual issues and rendering a written recommended order, and that the administrative 
law judge would act as the presiding officer regarding legal issues and would assist the Board 
in preparing that order. 
On June 20, 1991, petitioners filed a motion to close the hearing on the matter to all 
members of the press and public. On July 1, 1991, the Division filed an opposing memoran-
dum. The Salt Lake City Tribune filed a petition to intervene in this motion. On July 2, 1991, 
the Division granted the Tribune's motion to intervene, and on July 3, 1991, the Tribune filed 
its memorandum in opposition to petitioners' motion. On July 9 and 10, 1991, petitioners 
filed replies to the submissions of the Division and the Tribune. Oral argument on this motion 
was heard on April 1, 1992 by Judge Ecklund. On April 7, 1991, he ordered that petitioners' 
motion to close the hearing be conducted before the Board and that the hearing was governed 
by the Open and Public Meetings Act because the Board, rather than the Administrative Law 
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Judge was the presiding officer authorized to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
recommended order subsequent to any hearing on the merits. He also denied petitioners' 
motion to close the hearing, ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public. 
On June 14, 1991, the Division filed a motion seeking to exclude certain evidence, 
including: (1) K.W.'s prior sexual history and general reputation, and (2) evidence of that 
nature as to similarly situated witnesses. Petitioners filed a response to this motion on July 
1, 1991. On July 2, 1991, the Division filed a reply memorandum. Judge Ecklund heard 
oral argument on this motion on April 1, 1992. He ordered that evidence of K.W.'s and other 
witnesses' general prior sexual history or reputation shall be excluded from the proceeding on 
April 17, 1992. 
On June 11,1991, the Division filed a brief on the issue of the standard of proof which 
should govern a hearing on the merits of the action. Petitioners filed a response on June 21, 
1991, to which the Division replied on July 1, 1991. Judge Ecklund also heard this motion on 
April 1, 1992. Following the oral argument, on April 17, 1992, he ordered that the standard 
of proof for professional licensure proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Petitioners bring this Petition to appeal from all of these orders. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
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1. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the Board would act as 
presiding officer for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of law and, at the 
same time in the same proceeding, that the Administrative Law Judge would be the presiding 
officer for purposes of ruling on questions of law and procedure? 
2. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in denying petitioners' motion to close 
the hearing and in ordering that the hearing be open to the press and public? 
3. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that petitioners' motion to 
close the proceedings to the public and press was governed by the Open and Public Meetings 
Act because the finder of fact in the present action was the Board rather than the Administrative 
Law Judge? 
4. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in ordering that the evidence of K.W. 's 
and other witnesses' general prior sexual history be excluded from the proceeding? 
5. Did the Administrative Law Judge err in determining that the standard of proof 
for professional licensing proceedings initiated by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing is the preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence? 
Petitioners seek, for relief, the resolution of these issues. 
ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE AGENCY 
The factual recitation above indicates that each of these issues was briefed and argued 
before the Division of Professional Licensing, and that the Administrative Law Judge considered 
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each of these issues and issued separate orders on them. Copies of each of these orders are 
attached to this Petition. 
IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY 
Immediate appeal from these orders is necessary because petitioners will be irreparably 
harmed if they are forced to continue litigating this matter under these orders in order to obtain 
a final judgment. The major harm which will, in all probability, ensue should this petition be 
denied and petitioners be forced to continue litigation under the present orders is the complete, 
total and irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations resulting from an 
open and public hearing on the merits of the case. Because of the extremely controversial and 
inflammatory nature of the charges made by the Division against petitioners and the highly 
prejudicial nature of the evidence which might be introduced, petitioners, even if they were 
ultimately cleared of the Division's charges, would likely lose their dental practices and personal 
reputations as a consequence of extensive publicity in this matter. That any hearing on the 
merits will be highly publicized by the press and other media is extremely likely. The Salt 
Lake Tribune has already intervened in opposition to petitioners' motion to close the 
proceedings. K.W., one of the more controversial witnesses for the Division, has already 
appeared on local and national television and made statements about the case, which has already 
had serious repercussions for petitioners. Should this matter become a "media event," the 
ensuing trouble and loss of reputation for petitioners will be uncontainable and incalculable. 
For this reason, an interlocutory appeal on this order is critical to the administration of justice. 
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Petitioners should not be tried and convicted in the media, as they will almost assuredly be, but 
the issue should be adjudicated within the non-public confines of the appropriate, legislatively 
established tribunal. 
The issue of the identity of the presiding officer, similarly, needs immediate attention; 
the Division is only able to justify the application of the Open and Public Meetings Act to the 
present proceeding because of its order making the Board, rather than the Administrative Law 
Judge, the trier of fact. The order identifying the presiding officer responsible for factual 
findings as the Board is, therefore, the "cause" of the closure problem. If the Administrative 
Law Judge were the trier of fact, as the Utah Administrative Procedure Act contemplates, then 
the issue of closure of the hearing would possibly not exist. Further, there is substantial chance 
that this order, which allows the Division to "switch" presiding officers at will during the 
course of this single matter, in contravention of the intent of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act and other related statutes, will result in substantial arbitrariness and prejudice to petitioners. 
Petitioners will also be exposed to substantial prejudice as a result of the remaining 
two orders, which prejudice could be avoided should this Court grant their Petition for Review. 
Central to petitioners' defense is evidence of K.W.'s reputation for sexual immorality in 
general, and her previous, extensive, and ongoing pattern of behavior in seducing other medical 
practitioners by means of offering sexual favors in return for controlled substances. As a 
consequence of the Administrative Law Judge's Order excluding evidence of K.W.'s prior 
sexual history, petitioners' defense will be substantially impaired. This problem should be 
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remedied immediately, not after rendition of a final order, because petitioners will not be able, 
under the present order, to even proffer, let alone prove substantial evidence necessary for their 
defense, making an incomplete and ineffective record for appeal from the final order. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF IJTIGATTON 
Resolution of all four of these issues on an interlocutory appeal will materially advance 
the termination of the litigation because all four of them, if not resolved, now, will need to be 
resolved on an appeal if a final order adverse to petitioners is issued. The likelihood of such 
an adverse result is greatly increased by the exclusion of evidence of K.W.'s prior sexual 
history, which will deprive petitioners of a substantial and important defense, and the order 
determining that the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence rather 
than clear and convincing evidence. Should an adverse final order issue, petitioners would 
appeal these very issues and this Court would consider the appeal. Should this Court find an 
abuse of discretion on even one of these orders, the matter would have to be heard again at a 
substantial waste of time and expense to all parties concerned, with the additional danger that 
memories would have faded and evidence lost. In the context of the present litigation, it would 
be in the clear interest of efficiency as well as fairness to grant petitioners' Petition for Review 
of these interlocutory orders. 
JURISDICnONAL BASIS 
The present Petition for Review arises from four non-final administrative orders. This 
petition is, accordingly, brought under two alternative theories of jurisdiction: (1) an 
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interlocutory appeal under rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (1991), and (2) an extraordinary writ under rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Interlocutory Appeal 
Under the new Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and the applicable rules 
promulgated by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, M[a] party aggreived 
may obtain judicial review of final agency action . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l). 
Although the UAPA provides substantial rules for review of final administrative orders, see 
e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1991), 63-46b-13(l)(a) (1991), and 63-46b-14 
(1991), there appears to be absolutely no provision for an interlocutory appeal from an 
administrative order, except under following language from Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) 
(1991): 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting 
all administrative remedies available, except that: 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the 
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
Under this language, a party need not exhaust any or all administrative remedies, including 
obtaining a final order, in order to seek judicial review of the proceeding if the administrative 
remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit received from exhaustion. 
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Administrative remedies are inadequate in the present case because irreparable harm 
will be done to the professional and personal reputations of petitioners, regardless of the 
outcome of this proceeding, should the hearings be open to the press and public. Petitioners 
will also be damaged by the three other orders, as discussed above, unless afforded immediate 
relief. There is no provision in the UAPA or elsewhere that serves to remedy any of these 
problems. Consequently, the available administrative remedies are inadequate. The damage 
that would be done to the individual petitioners' reputations and ability to defend themselves 
from the Division's charges should they not be afforded immediate relief would be devastating 
to them, effectively putting them out of business regardless of the ultimate outcome of the 
matter. This is, surely, "irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from 
requiring exhaustion." 
Accordingly, this Petition for Review is brought under the applicable provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, including rule 14, which allows for judicial review by the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals "of an order or decision of an administrative agency, 
board, commission, committee, or officer." This language does not require that an order 
appealed from be a final order; because section 63-46b-14(2)(b) allows an interlocutory appeal 
under the present circumstances, this Petition should be granted. 
Further, this Petition is brought within 30 days of the date of the first order appealed 
from, and supplies the information required in Rule 14. Because this petition is in the nature 
of an interlocutory appeal, petitioners, in an effort to assist the Court, have followed the 
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format of a rule 5 petition even though rule 5 is inapplicable to administrative orders under 
rule 18. 
Extraordinary writ. 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for relief to be granted under 
its provisions "where no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists." If this Court 
should determine that a Petition for Review under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, this 
Court should grant review of the orders at issue under rule 65B. 
Under this rule, which was enacted in its present form in 1991, relief is available for 
several categories of injury, including the wrongful use of or failure to exercise public 
authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e) (1992). Under subsection (e), "[appropriate relief may be 
granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion . . . ." 
Although the form of rule 65B has been substantially changed recently, the substantive 
intent behind the rule, and the requirements for its application, have not changed over the last 
several decades. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have given instruc-
tion as to how this rule governing extraordinary writs is to be applied. Most instructive are 
the guidelines set forth in Anderson v. Baker, 5 Utah 2d 33, 296 P.2d 283 (1956): 
(1) If the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction or is proceeding in 
excess of its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy, the writ should 
issue as a matter of right. 
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(2) If the lower tribunal is proceeding without jurisdiction, but it 
appears that there is an adequate remedy, the writ should generally not issue, 
but the court is not entirely without discretion. 
(3) If the lower tribunal has jurisdiction but it appears that by an 
erroneous order it has placed one party in a position where he will be 
irreparably injured and that he has no adequate remedy to prevent the injury 
or retrieve his loss, then the court may in the exercise of its sound discretion 
use the writ as a procedure for intermediate review. 
(4) If there is no want or excess of jurisdiction and there is an 
adequate remedy, the writ should never issue. 
Rules (1) and (4) are absolutes. Rules (2) and (3) are guides. 
Id. at 285-86, (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. City Court for 
Citv of Qgden. 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256, 261)). 
In the present case, petitioners are appealing from orders of an administrative agency 
which are, in their view, abuses of the agency's discretion, thus falling squarely within 
subsection (e) of the rule. This situation also falls within section (3) of the Anderson 
guidelines, in that the Division has jurisdiction over the matter but the erroneous orders of the 
Division are placing petitioners in a position where they will be irreparably injured absent 
immediate review of the orders, and there is no other remedy of any sort available for 
petitioners. Consequently, this Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, use an 
extraordinary writ as a procedure for the intermediate review of the present orders. 
It is axiomatic that a party who has an adequate remedy at law cannot avail himself of 
a rule 65B petition. For example, the plaintiff, in Crist v. Mapleton Citv. 28 Utah 207, 497 
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P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972), did not avail himself of readily available remedies at law, so 
"placed himself out of the reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus." Likewise, the 
Anderson court ruled that H[a]n extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and 
cannot be used as such." Anderson. 296 P.2d at 285. Should this tribunal determine that an 
appeal under rule 14 is unavailable to petitioners, there is no other available remedy and 
petitioners should be entitled to review of the orders under rule 65B. 
It is equally axiomatic that where there is no adequate remedy at law, a rule 65B 
petition is available. For example, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield 
City. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), found that an action for extraordinary relief was the 
appropriate vehicle for obtaining review of the Davis City Council's decision to uphold denial 
of a conditional use permit sought by Davis County where there was no statutory provision for 
review of a city council action. Id. at 707. Petitioners, should this Court determine that a rule 
14 petition is unavailable, will be similarly situated with Davis County; a rule 65B writ should, 
therefore, be available to petitioners. 
In the present case, it is impractical and inappropriate to file this petition for a writ in 
the Division because there is no procedural provision for filing such a writ before the Division 
and a request to to the Division to reverse the order will likely be an exercise in futility. 
MEMORANDUM ON THE MERITS 
A petition for review brought under rule 14 does not require a memorandum on the 
merits of the case to be filed at the time the Petition is filed; briefing occurs pursuant to rules 
14 
18, 24, and other applicable rules of the Utah appellate courts subsequent to the filing of the 
Petition. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
the Petition. Petitioner has not filed such a memorandum concurrently with this Petition for 
two reasons: First, petitioner has brought this Petition, in the first alternative, as a rule 14 
Petition; should this Court determine that rule 14 relief is unavailable to petitioners then 
petitioners will promptly submit a rule 19 memorandum. Second, to adequately brief the merits 
of the issues, petitioners must have access to the transcript of the relevant proceedings before 
the Division. No transcript has yet been prepared, but, under the procedures outlined in rules 
15 and 16 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, would become available. Should this 
Court grant review on either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of this Court in obtaining 
the record of the proceedings from the Division, including the relevant transcripts. Petitioners 
also seek leave of the court in either granting them the opportunity to fully brief the merits of 
the issues pursuant to rules 18, 24, and all other applicable rules or, in the alternative, granting 
them an extension of time in which to file a rule 19 memorandum of points and authorities on 
the merits of the issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition for Review under the 
provisions of rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
12(2)(b). Should this Court determine that a Petition for Review is not available to petitioners 
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under these rules, petitioners request that this Court grant review through rule 65B of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Should this Court grant review under either theory, petitioners seek the assistance of 
the Court in obtaining the record of the proceedings, including the relevant transcripts, from 
the Division, and permission to brief the merits of the issues in full upon receipt of the 
transcripts. 
DATED this "7~H^ day of May, 1992. 
JACKSON HOWARD, / 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and 
LINDA J. BARCLAY, for 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Robert E. Steed 
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36 South State Street #1100 
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